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Badiou's teacher Plato argued that philosophy is a business of eros
(love and desire).l In the modern orbit, Freud has told us that love
is above all a business of identification. Plato's Symposiulll agrees
that philosophy begins with identification with, and love for,
certain beautiful individuals. It then ascends towards the love of
the beauty that is in many people towards the idea of beauty itself,
via the beauty that exists in laws, literature and philosophy. Yet
often enough, as the drunken Alkibiades shows in the SymposiulIl,
love does not make it beyond identification with beloved figures.
This is one concern that animated my article, 'Resurrecting
(Meta-)Political Theology'. Particularly in the antipodes, fuelled by
remnants of a distinct cultural cringe, a culture of mindlessly
identifying with the latest figures from the continent persists.
Philosophy and 'theory' in these cases in truth never transcends
philology: deciphering the often cryptic formulations of one or other
master. Often, too, on the model of the artistic (as against the
political) avant-garde, this philological act stands as substitute for
any political engagement. I confess to wanting to be a Socrates to this
Alkibiadean tendency, for Socrates famously spurned the great
Athenian general and tyrant in the name of philosophy.
Collerson's article is not of the purely philological type. It goes
to the heart of the philosophical and political issues that I believe
my article raises. Collerson's defence of Badiou is informed by his
I would like to thnnk Jonathnn Collerson for his excellent, spirited defence of Badiou ngainst
my theoreticnl nnd politicnl nttnck upon Badiou's work in Awltl }Ol/I'I/II/, no. 29/30.
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much wider knowledge of the history of leftist critical thought, from
Callinicos to Adorno back to Hegel, all of whom are duly cited.
My article's best feature, as far as Collerson is concerned, is that
it raises the topic that has long concerned Badiou, that of negation.
This philosophical consideration is informed by Badiou's acute
sense of the political malaise of the post-1968 Left: the collapse of
parliamentmy social democracy into the timidity of the neo-liberal
Third Way, and the wider collapse of radical politics into the
plurality of cultural struggles concerning particular lifestyle
choices and their recognition.
My article's worst feature is that I do not understand philosophy
as Badiou conceives it. Hence, I miss how Badiou eludes my
criticisms: pre-eminently that he embodies in new language the
ancient, frustrated position of a beautiful soul, whose only politics
can be one of outraged fanaticism.
Collerson stresses that if we take into account Badiou's notion of
subtraction, we can see that I have misrepresented his position. As
he notes, my argument denies that Badiou can mediate between
philosophy and politics. In Marxian terms, this means that he does
not provide the means for any determinate negation of the existing
order - just an abstract explosion of an Event, which, I suggest, not
very subtly, seell1S uncomfortably close to the premillenarian
Christian fundamentalist's rapture in its celebrated 'indiscernability'
from within today's world, and its appeal to a new, 'infinite' subject.
Badiou's notion of subtraction is, however, more constructive
than Tgive it credit for. It is like Schoenberg's refiguring of musical
composition: not just an abstract negation of old forms (which
,·vould be amusical sound), but composition according to a new set
of fornes. 'This renders Sharpe's claim that "Badiou is interested ...
in a radical new beginning" implausible'.2
Collerson's key point is to restate this defence of Badiou in
Badiou's own language, bOlTm-ved from mathematics. Since I am
not qualified in that discipline, let me defer to Collerson fully
before I make my response:
The unhappy consciousness thinks there is only the stark
alternation of P and A, 'the idea that the world knows only
the necessary rightist backlash and the powerless suicidal
leftism'. What the formula A = (AAp) is decomposed to here,
. -------------------
2 J. CollNson, 'Negat;on and Politics, A Reply to Matthew Sharpe on lIIan Badiou', in this
issue of /\",',/ll J"Url/o!, p. 2117.
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is Ap(Ap), where there is nothing but the regime of places,
and A(A), where the force is entirely abstract.3
However, Badiou replaces this unhappy oppositional way of
thinking with 'dialectical scission':
'There is A, and there is Ap (read: "A as such" and"A in an
other place," the place distributed by the space of placement,
or P): Badiou says. 'We thus have to posit a constitutive
scission: A = (AAp).' Any force, A, is split between itself and
its indexation to the regime of places that structure a
situation, P.4
If this all sounds terribly abstract, Collerson asserts its direct
political application. He targets my charge that Badiou posits the
state as 'infinitely errant' in its power, which is why I charge that
his thought can allow no possibility for immanent political change:
If we consider the national situation, individuals are
presented as elements but are re-presented as parts: citizens
and non-citizens, tax-payers, trade unionists and bosses,
ethnic minorities, et cetera, in order to fix them to a set of
structural places; to hold together an indifferent multiplicity
in a consistent 'one' nation. What is important is that these
included determinations have a quantitative power
(number) in errant excess of the presented situation as such;
an individual relates to this errant infinity as having
'alienating and repressive powers of indeterminacy', what
we have just been writing Ap(A).5
And here is Collerson's key reversal. I am taken to misread the
force of this 'errancy', in a too pessimistic way. Badiou himself says,
'the resignation that characterises a time without politics feeds on
the fact that the State is not at a distance, because the measure of its
power is errant'.6 In truth, the errant infinite power of the state is
actually the ground of the possibility of the immanent political
change I calU'\Ot see in Badiou.
That the state is a fictionalization of what it duplicates means
that parts do not necessarily rely on elements for their existence
... By allowing fictions to exist in the situation, the state itself
3 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 211.
4 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 210.
5 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 212.
6 A. Badioll, Mctfll',,'itics, trons. J. Barker, London, Verso, 2005, p. 145.
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creates the possibility of a breakdown of the structure, that it
might have missed or included something it should not have.?
Hence, later, Collerson concludes: 'The infinite power of the state
does not limit possibilities for the Left, but creates them; in the last
instance the subject is the product of its own impasse, or A = (AAp)'.8
At the deepest level, Collerson thinks that what is at issue in all of
these shortcomings of my Badiou is that I do not lmderstand what
philosophy allegedly has always been: 'to set out the possibility of
thinking against the state mtder the condition of the state'.9 This
largest or metaphilosophical error has several consequences. On one
side, I fall unhappily into 'what Lenin referred to as ecol1omism: the
attribution of philistinism to practice, or the separation of thought
from politics'.lD On another - in seeming tension with this - when
I point out that 'many militants, or any other political agents' have
probably not reflected on whether their worldly projects are 'worthy of
TIlought' by philosophers, I 'presuppose a role for philosophy within
militant projects after having noted that Badiou holds the opposite
view'. The question that I above all do not ask is: 'What is a time with
politicS?',l1 if I am to criticize Badiou for being lmable to 'save' the Left.
Amongst the virtues of Collerson's strident critique of my
Badiou is that it allows me to set out very forthrightly our complete
difference of opinion, and in terms of how we understand
philosophy and (its relation to) politics. I have to say very strongly
that I do not know where the idea that philosophy has always been
'to set out the possibility of thinking against the state under the
condition of the state' comes from, nor to what notion of
philosophy it refers. It certainly does not refer to political
philosophy as it was practised from Plato through to Marx. For
what are we then to make of Plato's Laws or Statesman, or Aristotle's
Politics, if not attempts to decide on the best form of public
authority, if not 'state'? The true provenance of Badiou's definition
of philosophy here is actually the post-philosophical theory hailing
7 Collerson. 'Negation and Politics', pp. 212-B.
8 Collersnn, 'Negation and Politics', p. 213.
9 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 214.
10 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 208. Lenin's argument in Wlm' ;s '0 I", DOlle? (1902) is
that the ,,,,orking class is spolltnnenusly validatinl-; the view thnt cOJl1IllUniSlll is their self-
emancipation, but that his fellow intellectuals sec workers as very limited, only being able
to engngc in 'economic' struggles lind 'hip-pockel' issues, not 'political' struggle, which
should be left to the enlightened middle classes. He repeatedly accuses his conte;11poraries
of attributing thl'ir own philistinisl11 to workers. Sec V. Leoin, Wlm' ;s '0 be' DOllc? (1lJ(2),
Moscow, Progress, 1978, pp. 63-4.
11 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 2"13.
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from Paris since the early 1960s, of which Badiou has otherwise
been one of the best polemical critics.
Readers have also to note the stUlu1ingly ahistorical notion of the
'state' here: for Badiouians it refers ultimately to any ordering
principle which 'counts as one', an otherwise disordered
multiplicity of elements, in all fields from mathematical set theory
to Parisian politics. To cite Collerson:
What does that mean?
If our situation is the infinite set of 'all natural numbers', we
can count out a supplementary set of its squares. The elements
- 1, 2, 3, 4, et cetera - belong to the situation, the part - 1, 4,
9, 16, et cetera - is included. The 'state of the situation'
duplicates the situation by including every conceivable part in
order to delimit the situation's 'void', viz. the underlying and
indifferent multiplicity that testifies that the structure might be
otherwise - what we have just been calling the absent cause.12
But the political state is, historically, a modern institution. In the
pre-modern world there were poleis, there were empires,
princedoms, fiefdoms, tribes - all manner of collective organizations.
But there was nothing of the order of the modern 'state', with its
rationally (as against patrimonially) organized bureaucratic
structures, its founding dissolution and consolidation of older
geographical and parochial unities, its newly unified currencies
and its rationalized general laws. The English word 'state' and its
cognates (stato in Italian, etat in French, Staat in German and Estado
in Spanish and Portuguese) derive from the Latin statvs:
something's 'standing', 'condition' or 'status'. With the revival of
the Roman law in the fourteenth century in Europe, this Latin term
came to refer to the legal 'standing' of persons (the various 'estates
of the realm'), including the privileged status of the monarch.
However, these are not the modern meanings of the word, which
clearly (and absurdly) colours Badiou's false homology between
the mathematical and political 'states'. Only after the consolidation
of the modern nation-states in the seventeenth century did the
word lose its reference to particular social groups and take on its
modern meaning, wherein it names the legal order of the entire
society and the apparatus of its enforcement.13
12 Collerson, 'Negation and Politics', p. 212.
13 Q. Skinner, 'The State', in T. Ball, J. FatT and R. L. Hanson (eds), Polilical I/I/lomlio/l a/ld
CO/lcc/,I/lal Cila/lge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.




I do not mean to be pedantic; the point is simply to repeat my
original article's critique of Badiou's philosophical Platonism: his
tendency to over-burden a priori, ultimately mathematical, theoretical
rationality. This is to miss what the Marxist heritage, which is more
Aristotelian and empirically grounded, emphasizes: namely that
the meaning of political institutions and practice changes dialectically
over time, depending on the chcll1ging historical parameters they
are situated in. The modern state was a progressive force in dis-
banding the old feudal social relations, and enabling the emanci-
pation of people from indentured servitude and fiefdom. Arms of
the state can and have opposed other arms with real progressive
force, as recently as the judiciary challenging the power grabs of the
British, American and Australian executives. To only think against
the state, a priori, seems strategically limited and theoretically
retrograde, even romanticist ('authority is bad, man', et cetera). I
wonder what notion of the human condition underlies some of the
more openly messianic motifs so popular in contemporary theory:
the notion of a society which does not have any formal laws or
agencies to enforce them seems like the type of utopianism that
Marx's attempt to ground socialism in social science would prevent.
In truth, what I think Collerson does not see - and perhaps
could not imagine - is that this author brings to political theory a
very different set of presuppositions than that shaped by the
French thinkers of 1968. This author is not even sure that many of
their presuppositions have not been directly responsible for today's
widened gulf between theory and progressive political
movements. When writing on politics, I come out of a training in
political philosophy and the history of political ideas. This tradition,
one more discipline post-68 'end of philosophy' was supposed to
consign to history's dustbin, does insist that there is a gulf between
theOJ'ia, the business of philosophers interested in t7 priori and
necessary things, and praxis, the business of engaged political agents
contesting what is just and possible for political beings, amongst
the things they might feasibly change through concerted action.
Political philosophers must ascend out of people's confused and
contested opinions about political matters towards truths - for
example, mathematical truths - which might provide them with
standards to adjudicate what is possible or desirable. However, this
ascent is not enough, as Collerson acknowledges I contend.
Philosophers must then also undertake the difficult business of
bringing their ideas back to the ground of political practice,
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including convincing others of the abiding worth of their views.
This means they must have or develop an adequate, empirically
based understanding of the way political life actually works, as
weU as rhetoric with which - if they are progressive thinkers -
many people could feasibly identify. Otherwise, the philosopher's
prescriptions for political change will remain utopian or messianic.
Elsewhere I have caUed this situation the 'politico-philosophical
difference', for readers with an eye for buzzwords.14 Politics and
philosophy concern different realms, and political philosophy is
the reflective discipline which tries to mediate or bring them
together. This understanding of political philosophy is preserved in
its way in the heritage of critical theory in Germany, but has
disappeared completely from France over the last one hundred
years. This difference of politics and philosophy is not a
'metaphysical' difference - but one between metaphysical
concerns for timeless things and the realm of human action,
concerning desirable and changeable things. But nor can it be
defined away, as CoUerson or Badiou does, by begging the question
and simply declaring 'politics is thought'. Our theorists are not
tyrannical Hobbesian sovereigns, so we should be loath to let them
make words mean whatever they say they should. And then there
is the question, which type of thought?
This brings me to my next point. Collerson has misrepresented
me when he accuses me of taking most people's politics as
characterized by 'philstinism'. The point is that ordinary people's
politics has its own intrinsic dignity, indeed its own sui gClleris
species of rationality, namely phronesis, or practical reason. So my
answer to CoUerson's further charge that I do not seem to believe
there ever was a period 'with politics' has to be, actually, 'there is
always politics, although its forms change historically'. Phroncsis,
as I tried to explain by citing Aristotle in my initial essay, is that
type of reason which concerns changeable things that humans can
enact or reject, based on their estimations of what seems desirable
in the complex circumstances of practical life, and given the
plurality of different people and the plurality of different goods we
can all pursue. (All this for Badiouians is of course 'beneath the
dignity of thought'.) A reference to phronesis may not satisfy the
mathematician, as it will not the avant-garde artist, both of whose
l-l M. Shnrpe. 'A Question of Two Truths? Remnrks on I'nrrhesin nnd the "I'oliticnl-
PhilosophiGll" Difference', in Pllrrill's;lI: A /olll"lltli oiCril;mll'ilil"""l'ily, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp.
89-108. .
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practices involve suspending and transcending this exactly
'mundane' (of the political world) form of reasoning. Phronesis is an
art of the possible, or not a productive tcc/me at all, issuing as it
rather does in prnxcis, practical actions. In complex modern
societies, whose material and political reproduction depend on the
development of media-steered subsystems (pre-eminently the
economy) where the vast number of practical actions by
individuals produce quasi-natural regularities (like economic
laws), phronesis actually demands that we defer, on certain
questions concerning what is possible, to the social sciences.
So if I were to tell the type of master story a lot of post-1968
theory does, I would say that what has been lost to modern
philosophy is an appreciation of the irreducibility and importance
of phronesis. Philosophy, always more at home in theoretical
activities, turned with the burgeoning modern age to a species of
technical or instrumental rationality, the type embodied in modern
science. The sciences, it was hoped, would relieve the human
estate, making us 'masters and possessors of nature' (Descartes).
And so it seemed that we would have no need for the
circumstantial, probabilistic, normative and unsystematizable
business of practical reason. Amongst other things, as with Badiou,
we would hence see no need to wonder whether our purely
theoretical constructs could ever have relevance in political life,
short of more or less violently or technologically imposing them
from on high. Political philosophy for Aristotle was by contrast a
species of p/zronesis, practical, not purely theoretical reason.
So when Collerson accuses me of scholasticism for not supporting
Badiou's paeans to absolutely, even mathematically, unforeseeable
events, he is very much in the orbit of the type of modern
philosophy that I would charge has deleteriously abstracted, too
far, from the fabric of political life. The result is the characteristic
post-1968, post-structuralist rhetoric of absolute indiscernabilty,
undecidability, incalculabilty - as if to form a set of political
programs based on a concrete, material sense of what a more just
distribution of the goods and duties of shared life might involve is
sOInehow 'scholastic'. This grants way too much, as far as I can see,
to the powers that be, who are quite happy to be 'scholastic' in their
international forums and financial houses, while the academic Left
angsts over the possibility that the allegedly infinite power of the
state might create 'evental sites' and so on.
Of course, Collerson is right that currently we are seeing how the
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present world order, like all political orders, does produce
contradictions, in this case a contradiction between fictitious capital
and its basis in the real economy. Yet we do not need the baroque
sanction of a French flm/tre penseur and set theory to allow us to
predict and map this. If the Left is to strategically intervene, we
need political economics and the ability to generate an alternative
set of arrangements to re-gear the world economy so it is less
destructive, and whole communities are held less in sway to its
inhuman irrationality.
There are a lot more points about my article that Collerson,
perhaps because of space, could not consider. Let me close for my
part by answering a question Badiou asks about his hero, Plato.
'This is the question of how could the first great philosopher, who
decisively broke with the poetic-mythological orbit of the pre-
philosophical Greeks, also come to write the theological Book X of
Plato's Laws, in which he expels the sophists, invoking 'the sombre
knotted scheming of ecstasy, the sacred and terror', in this way
exposing 'the whole of his thinking to disaster'.15
We can answer by recourse to Plato's other key dialogue in
political philosophy, The Republic. The Republic also advocates a
fairly austere theology, complete with noble lies to pacify and train
the ideal regime's guardians.16 Throughout, the author serves us
notice that the wholly philosophical scheme is very problematic
and even an edifying lie17 because it tries impossibly to dictate
'thought' to the political realm, ultimately by proposing the
complete change of people's habits in love and gender. Yet the key
addressee for Socrates' tall tale, who does not get the joke, is a
passionate young man, Plato's younger brother, named Glaucon.
Glaucon continues to be enamoured by the vision of the kallipolis,
or polis in speech, right to the end, when Socrates tells him that to
truly start a new, philosophically Just City, we would have to kill or
expel all adults over ten 'into the fields', so we could shape the
children according to wisdom. It is not too harsh to say that
Glaucon is a fool. But then, as Plato shows us in The Republic book
VII, he is not a fool in all things. As book VII would have it, our hot-
blooded young friend is particularly good at geometry, for the
Greeks the highest form of mathematics.
15 A. Bndiou, Mllllitt',lo!t,,· l'"il""I'" If, trnns. N. M"dnl'(lsz, New York, Suny Press, 1989, p. 134.
16 Tllc RCI'"I,lie, 377b-39Sb.
17 See TI,C RCI'"blie, 414c-d; 420b-e; 432b-433e; 450a-451b; 452a-b457e-45Bc; 472"-473b.
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